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Abstract
This paper compares three schemes for funding Universal Service Obliga-
tions in network industries with an essential facility: an uplift to the network
access charge, the establishment of a Universal Service (US) fund ﬁnanced
through a lump-sum tax and a US fund ﬁnanced through a unit tax. The
comparison is made under a duopoly structure with a potential entrant and
an incumbent, which owns the essential facility and is responsible for univer-
sal service. The incumbent is also constrained to oﬀer the same price on all
markets. Using a social welfare criteria, we show that the US fund ﬁnanced
with a lump sum tax dominates the other two schemes, while the US fund
with unit tax is equivalent to the access charge uplift.
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In recent years, many countries have implemented regulatory reforms into their
public utility sectors, such as telecommunications, electricity and postal services.
The general orientation of these reforms is to move away from franchised monopolies
toward more open markets by removing some or all existing barriers of entry.
With free entry and exit in markets, however, some non-proﬁtable markets is at
risk of losing service. For equity as well as eﬃciency purposes,1 governments often
include in the regulatory reforms some programs insuring that all consumers will keep
access to the public utility services, i.e. insuring Universal Service (US). A common
way of doing this is to mandate one ﬁrm to serve some non-proﬁtable segments
of the market and to provide a ﬁnancial compensation for this so-called Universal
Service Obligation (USO). The USO mandate can impose either one or both of the
following constraints (Chone et al. [3]): “The ubiquity constraint [which] states
that all consumers should be connected to a network, whatever their location. The
nondiscrimination constraint [which] states that the same tariﬀ should be proposed
to all those consumers, whatever their location or their connection cost”.
In this paper, we analyze three schemes for funding US under both ubiquity and
non-discrimination constraints. In the ﬁrst scheme, funding is obtained through
an uplift to the access charge that suppliers must pay for using the incumbent’s
essential facility. This access charge then does more than compensate for the cost
of network usage; it implicitly contains a supplementary tax aimed at subsidizing
non-proﬁtable markets. In the second scheme, a fund is established in order to
ﬁnance activities on loss-making markets, while the access charge is dedicated to
network usage compensation on proﬁtable markets. This fund is raised through a
1Eﬃciency considerations that can lead to government intervention include the presence of
positive externalities, such as the network externalities prevalent in the communications industry.
In this paper, however, we focus on cases where service to a community is warranted (total utility
is greater than total cost) although providing service is not proﬁtable for the ﬁrms because of
their incapacity of practicing perfect price discrimination. This possibility has been outlined, for
instance, by Kahn [5], p.132.
2lump-sum tax on proﬁtable markets and is used to ﬁnance a unit and/or a lump-sum
subsidy for loss-making markets. The third scheme is identical to the second except
that the fund is raised through a unit tax. For the three schemes, we assume that
USOs are allocated to the incumbent monopoly that existed before the regulatory
reform.2 We also assume that this incumbent owns an essential facility (e.g. the
network) that any entrant must access to deliver service to consumers.
We show, on the one hand, that the US fund with unit tax is equivalent to the
access charge uplift in the sense that it leads to the same market equilibrium. On the
other hand, we prove that welfare is generally the highest under the US fund with a
lump-sum tax because this fund scheme uses two instruments, an access charge and
a unit subsidy, to reach two diﬀerent goals: (i) recover the network costs and (ii)
counter the reduction of output that USO provokes by confering some market power
to the incumbent. This market power comes from the fact that the incumbent
is given a monopoly franchise on a market that is guaranteed to avoid losses by
regulation. Although this monopoly power is partly checked by the fact that the
incumbent must oﬀer the same price on all markets, an uplift on top of a network
break-even access charge would nevertheless exacerbate the downward distortion on
output.
This result in fact combines propositions made by Armstrong [1]a n dH o e r n i g
and Valetti [4]. Focusing on productive eﬃciency, Armstrong [1] concludes that
“retail instruments (perhaps in the form of a carefully designed universal service
fund) should be used to combat retail-level distortions such as mandated tariﬀs
that involve cross-subsidies. Wholesale instruments should then be used to combat
potential productive ineﬃciencies”.3 However, this focus on productive eﬃciency
leads him to assume that the price of the incumbent’s service is mandated by a
regulatory agency and is determined outside t h em o d e l . A sw ea s s u m et h a tt h e
entrant and incumbent retail costs are identical, we preclude here any possibility
of productive ineﬃciency; we rather focus on allocative eﬃciency and determine
2This is often the case in practice. Note, however, that USOs could be allocated in a number
of ways, including auctions. See for instance Anton et al. [1].
3p. 301.
3endogenously prices that USO funding schemes entail. Our wholesale instrument
(access charge) is then used for cost recovery on proﬁtable markets, i.e. markets
that would be served without USO, while our “retail instrument” (unit subsidy) is
used to counter the fact, observed by Hoernig and Valetti [4] that “a uniform pricing
restriction creates linkages between markets...This makes operators less agressive in
those markets, leading to higher equilibrium prices and deadweight loss”.
Our model is similar to those of Mirabel and Poudou [6] and Chone et al.[3]. A
crucial assumption of their papers, however, is that ﬁrms are able to practice perfect
price discrimination.4 “Non-proﬁtability” of a market then means that aggregate
consumers’ and producers’ surplus on such a market is negative. As a result,
government intervention to impose universal service must be justiﬁed by equity or
eﬃciency considerations which are outside the models: within the models’ logic, a
market is not served if and only if it is not socially optimal to have service. Here,
we rather assume that it is socially optimal to serve each market, but that some
markets are not proﬁtable because ﬁrms are unable to extract enough surplus from
transactions with their consumers. Using the same demand functions as in Mirabel
and Poudou[6] and in Chone et al.[3], this translates in the assumption that ﬁrms
are constrained to relate on linear pricing.
Compared to non-linear pricing, the requirement of uniform prices will reduce
the initial advantage of the incumbent. As a result, under our benchmark case of
free competition without USO, ﬁrms obtain zero proﬁt.5 Then, the primary eﬀect
of the imposition of USO is to legally institute cross-subsidization that could not
be sustained under competition. This amounts to a “reduction of contestability”
that will beneﬁtb o t hﬁrms, as they will be able to gain positive proﬁts6.U S O
4Because consumers have homogeneous preferences in these models, perfect price discrimination
is attained by two-part tarriﬀs. Results of the models, however, depend on the capacity of the
ﬁrms of practicing perfect price discrimination.
5In Mirabel and Poudou [6], the benchmark case of competition without USO allows the in-
cumbent to earn a positive proﬁt which amounts to the diﬀerence between the total surplus that
the incumbent can extract and the total surplus that the potential entrant can extract.
6Under the US fund, however, the entrant’s proﬁt may eventually be taxed away through a
lump sum tranfer to the fund.
4would then be supported by the ﬁrms and, unsurprisingly, by consumers not served
without USO, the targeted beneﬁciaries of USO. Consumers that would be served
without USO pay for the cross-subsidies and are thus the losers of USO.
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents the equilibrium that would
prevail without USO, which represents our benchmark case. Sections 4 and 5
derive equilibria under the access charge uplift, the US fund, respectively. Welfare
comparisons of the schemes are done in Section 6. Section 7 oﬀers some concluding
remarks.
2M o d e l
2.1 Cost, Demand and Proﬁt Functions
A network industry supplies an homogeneous good that is not storable. Two types
of consumers are served, distinguished by their ﬁxed connection cost to the network.
For instance, the ﬁxed connection cost of one particular consumer could depend on
geographical location (rural vs. urban regions). We denote this ﬁxed cost by F(µ),
where µ takes either value L or H depending on whether the consumer lives in a low
ﬁxed cost area or a high ﬁxed cost area, respectively: F(L) <F(H). Proportions
of consumers of types L and H are αL and αH, respectively, with αL+αH =1 .F o r
simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of producing the good and using the
network is zero, so that total cost of supplying the good to a consumer of type µ is
F(µ).
Consumers’ preferences are identical and are represented by the demand function
q(·). This demand is twice diﬀerentiable and is such that marginal revenue is
always decreasing with quantity. Social welfare W is then measured as the sum of







αHq(p)dp − ¯ F (1)
where ¯ F = αLF(L)+αHF(H)
5It is assumed that the connecting costs of type-H consumers are so high compared
to the revenues that can be obtained from these consumers that no enterprise ever
ﬁnds proﬁtable to serve this type of consumers without subsidies or other forms of
help from government. Letting π(p,µ) be the proﬁtf r o ms e r v i n gac o n s u m e ro f
type µ at price p, this assumption means that:
π(p,H)=pq(p) − F(H) < 0, ∀p>0
We call market µ the set of consumers of type µ, µ = {L,H}.D e m a n d o f m a r k e t
µ is then αµq(·). We assume that a single supplier can make a non-negative proﬁt
by serving both markets at a uniform price. Let p0 be the monopoly price on

















− ¯ F ≥ 0 (2)
Following Mirabel and Poudou [6], we assume a duopoly where ﬁrms are indexed
by i ∈ {I,E}.O n e ﬁrm i = I is an incumbent that owns the network and has
a legal obligation to serve type-H consumers. This obligation is compensated
by a governmental scheme to help ﬁnance the market-H activities. By law, the
incumbent must provide third party access to the other ﬁrm i = E, a (potential)
entrant. Access is provided to the regulated price a per unit.7
There is then accounting separation of the incumbent’s production activities
and the supply of network facilities. Incumbent’s proﬁtf r o mn e t w o r ka c c e s st oa
consumer of type µ is:
πn(p,µ)=aq(p) − F(µ)
and this proﬁt is obtained independently of the fact that the good is produced and
sold by the incumbent or the entrant. In the case the incumbent takes charge of
production and distribution to the consumers, the production/distribution proﬁti s
given by:
πd(p,µ)=( p − a)q(p)
7This price is called the access charge.
6i.e.the “distribution division” of the ﬁrm pays the “network division” for network
access. Of course, this transfer within the same ﬁrm does not impact on the ﬁrm’s
global proﬁt. As a result, the incumbent’s proﬁt πI is independent of the access
charge whenever it serves the market:
πI(p,µ)=πd(p,µ)+πn(p,µ)=pq − F(µ)
The entrant’s proﬁtf u n c t i o nf r o ms e r v i n gac o n s u m e ri s :
πE(p;a)=( p − a)q(p)
We consider a three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, government chooses the
relevant parameters for the universal service funding, i.e the level of the access charge
and/or various subsidies and taxes, depending on the funding scheme. The choice
is made in order to insure that the incumbent’s network activities break even. In
the second stage, the incumbent chooses the price of output, acting as a Stackelberg
leader8 vis-à-vis the entrant. In the third stage, the entrant sets its price.
2.2 Universal Service, Funding Schemes and Payoﬀ Func-
tions
Universal Service Obligations are meant to provide a minimum quality to all po-
tential customers. It is thus a set of constraints — or regulation — imposed on the
service supplier. Of course, these constraints can vary a lot from one jurisdiction
to the other. We focus on two widely used obligations: geographic ubiquity and
nondiscrimination. In the context of our model, ubiquity means that the incumbent
is mandated to serve market H, while non-discrimination means that the incumbent
has to post the same price for service on both markets.
8In the theoretical literature on USO, it is standard to assume such an industrial structure,
where an incumbent has a leadership with regard to another ﬁrm, the entrant (see for example [1]).
This leadership could stem from an historical position, a competitive advantage or a commitment
decision
7Constraint 1 (Non-discrimination): The incumbent posts the same price pI
on both markets µ ∈ {L,H}.
Note that this constraint does not imply that the price is the same on both
markets as the entrant could undercut the incumbent on market L.S i n c e , i n o u r
model, the demand function is the same on both markets, the ubiquity constraint
boils down to:
Constraint 2 (Ubiquity): q(pH) > 0
Together, constraints 1 and 2 imply that market L is also served: consumers of
market L are as willing to consume at price pH than those of market H and they
could even enjoy a lower price from the entrant.
If markets are deregulated, the US providers must be compensated for the cost
they incur; otherwise, cream skiming will occur on proﬁtable markets and the US
provider will be left with loss-making markets. For instance, the current EU regu-
latory framework for telecommunications allow for two funding options. “The ﬁrst
is to levy supplementary charges on top of regular interconnection charges, and the
second is to create a US fund. The Commission has clearly stated that it prefers the
second option, whereby the US cost is paid out of the State budget, by eligible par-
ticipants, or by end users through a tax”(Hoernig and Valetti[4], p. 8). Accordingly,
we consider the following funding schemes that include the supplementary charges
option (access charge uplift) and two versions of the US fund that are diﬀerentiated
by the way the fund is raised.9
Access charge uplift. Under this scheme, the access charge plays the dual
role of making an entrant pay for the service it uses (market L access) and ﬁnancing
universal service. In other words, the access charge is set by government in order
9However, we exclude from the analysis the possibility of raising fund directly from the State
budget and impose self-ﬁnancing from the industry (which corresponds formally to the government
budget constraint below). The reason is that the desirability of State ﬁnancing depends solely on
the “shadow cost” of public fund, which is necessarily exogenous in a partial equilibrium model as
ours.
8to cover overall network costs. Receipts from access charges accrue directly to the
incumbent. This was the temporary mechanism applied in France for electricity
between February 1999 and February 2000.
US funded with a lump-sum proﬁtt a x . The access charge is exclusively
dedicated to compensate the incumbent for network usage on the competitive mar-
k e t ,b u tal u m ps u mt a xi sl e v i e do nm a r k e tL proﬁti no r d e rt oﬁnance a US fund.
The lump-sum must be low enough to insure that the market is still served by the
entrant or the incumbent. The fund can be used in two ways to incite the incumbent
to serve market H:a l u m p - s u m s u b s i d y S and/or a unit subsidy s. Market licences
that are diﬀerentiated according to proﬁt expectations are examples of lump-sum
funding.
US funded with a unit tax. The access charge is again used only to com-
pensate for market L network costs, but the US fund is now raised through a unit
tax t levied on both markets.10 The fund serves again to ﬁnance a lump-sum or unit
subsidy. For instance, France now charges a unit consumption tax on electricity
whose receipts are dedicated for a US fund— the so-called FSPPE11 In terms of
our model, this means that the access charge is used only to compensate for market
L network costs, but the US fund is now raised through a unit tax to ﬁnance a
lump-sum and/or a unit subsidy.
We constrain both funding schemes to be “self-ﬁnancing” in the sense that total
subsidy payment cannot exceed total tax receipts T. We then have the following
10We use the accounting convention that a unit tax must be levied on both markets. This
convention is in the spirit of deregulation where the network is legally considered as a separate
entity from the incumbent, either because of separate ownership or because of regulation imposing
separate accounting. Since the network cost is not included in the incumbent’s distribution activity,
formally, the incumbent does not incur network costs and must pay a tax (and the access charge)
for market H operations as it, or the entrant, would for market L.
11The use of a consumption tax rather of a production tax is warranted to avoid a competitive
disadvantage to domestic producers from international competition on internal markets. If all ﬁrms
are domestic, as it is implicitly assumed in our model, a consumption tax is strictly equivalent to
a production tax and we do not distinguish between them.
9government budget constraint:
B(s,t,S,T)=sαHq(pH(·)) + S − tq (pL(·)) − T ≥ 0 (3)
where pµ(a,s,t,S,T) are equilibrium prices for given tax and subsidy parameters.
The following table, where πL(a,s,t,S,T) denotes the equilibrium proﬁto nm a r -
ket L and Q ≡ αLq(pL)+αHq(pH), presents schematically these schemes.
Charges and taxes Form of US payment Constraints









πL ≥ 0,B≥ 0




πL ≥ 0,B≥ 0
Diﬀerent schemes are thus diﬀerent combinations of lump-sum tranfers and unit
taxes or subsidies. Sometimes, they can be indistinguishable from the point of view
of one of the ﬁrm. For instance, from the point of view of the entrant, a given
unit tax is equivalent to an access charge of the same amount. However, the access
charge is not equivalent to the unit tax for the government because their uses are not
constrained in the same way: the access charge is constrained of covering network
costs, while the unit tax is constrained by market L overall proﬁt. Moreover, the
revenue from the access charge accrue directly to the incumbent, while the revenue
of the unit tax is placed in a fund to be redistributed afterwards to the incumbent
in the form of a unit or lump-sum subsidy. These diﬀerences can potentially impact
on incentives given for service on market H.
Diﬀerences in the funding schemes essentially modify the ﬁrms’ payoﬀ functions
of the ﬁrms. We ﬁrst deﬁne a general payoﬀ functions for both ﬁrms that account of
all possible instruments used by the government (a,t,T,s and S). Payoﬀ functions
for a given funding scheme will be a particular case of these general payoﬀ functions
10where some instruments are set to zero. The strategic variables are each ﬁrm’s
price. Since goods from both ﬁrms are perfectly homogeneous from the consumers’
point of view, the ﬁrm that announces the lowest price can serve the entire market
if it wishes.12 The entrant will then capture all the market if it announces a price





(pE − τ)αLq(pE) − T if pE ≤ pI
0 if pE >p I
(4)
The entrant chooses pE in order to maximize of ΠE. This leads to a reaction
function RE(pI;τ,T) that is taken into account by the incumbent and the govern-
ment. The incumbent receives any subsidy s or S for serving market H as well as
the access charges. In counterpart, it has to pay the unit tax t for its output sold
on either market L or H, and lump-sum tax T if it serves market L.M a r k e t L is
served by the incumbent whenever it posts a price that is lower than the entrant’s.






(pI +( s − t))αHq(pI)+aαLq(RE(pI;a)) − ¯ F + S if pI ≥ RE(·)
(pI +( s − t))αHq(pI)+( pI − t)αLq(pI) − ¯ F + S − T if pI <R E(·)
(5)
The incumbent then chooses price pI in order to maximize ΠI. This leads to a
reaction function RI(a,t,T,s,S) that is taken into account by the government.14
In many cases, the ﬁrm optimal choice of strategy will involve the determination
of a monopoly price with an appropriately chosen implicit marginal cost. In other
12Since both ﬁrms will always face constant marginal costs, if it is proﬁtable to serve part of the
market at a given price, it is more proﬁt a b l et os e r v et h ee n t i r em a r k e t . T h u st h eﬁrm with the
lowest price will serve the entire market.
13We consider that the entrant wins the market if it exactly matches the incumbent’s price. If
we rather consider that, under a price tie, the market is served by the incumbent or is shared
between ﬁrms, quantities, prices and welfare stay identical.
14Note that the incumbent is forced to serve market H by the government, so that we do not
include a participation constraint ΠI ≥ 0. In fact, the funding schemes are constrained to insure
that network costs are covered so that the participation is implicitly taken into account when the
government sets parameters (a,t,T,s,S).
11words, optimal choice of strategy of either ﬁrm will be the result of one or many
problems of the form:
max
p (p − c)q(p) (6)
where c w i l lb eaf u n c t i o no ft h es c h e m ep a r a m e t e r s(a,t,T,s,S).T h e o p t i m a l
























where η(p) ≡− q0p/q is the price elasticity of demand. This is of course the standard







As c will be implicitly deﬁned by the various schemes parameters, we will want







2q0 +( p∗ − c)q00 > 0
Note that monopoly price p0 was the result of solving problem (6) for the par-
ticular case where marginal cost is zero: p0 = p∗(0).
2.3 Entrant’s Best Reply
From the entrant’s payoﬀ function (4), we see that if pE >p I, the proﬁt is nil, so
this reply gives us zero as a lower bound to the proﬁt in the case that the entrant




(pE − τ)αLq(pE) − T
s.t.
pI − pE ≥ 0
(pE − τ)αLq(pE) − T ≥ 0
(8)
12Let λ ≥ 0 be the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint pI − pE ≥ 0.W e
solve the problem by ignoring ﬁrst the participation constaint and check afterwards
whether it is met or not. The FOC (suﬃcient here) are
αL[q(pE)+( pE − τ)q
0(pE)] − λ =0 (9)
λ(pI − pE)=0 (10)
Two cases must then be considered.
Case 1 λ =0and pE ≤ pI
Then, from (9), the optimal solution p∗


















This is the case where the incumbent’s price is so high that it allows the entrant to
get the monopoly price considering that the entrant’s marginal cost is τ.I f t h e l u m p
sum tax T does not swamp the monopoly gross proﬁt αL(p∗
E − τ)q(p∗
E), then the
entrant eﬀectively chooses p∗
E. Otherwise, there is formally no solution to problem
(8), which means in our context that the entrant excludes itself from the market by
choosing any price pE ∈ (pI,∞).
Case 2 λ>0 and pE = pI








which implies that pI <p ∗(τ). This is the case where pI is below the entrant’s
monopoly price p∗(τ), so that the best reply to pI is simply to match the price,
considering that the lump-sum tax T then leaves a non-negative proﬁt. If such a
price leads to a negative proﬁt, the entrant rather chooses any price in the interval
(pI,∞).




   
   
p∗(τ) if pI ≥ p∗(τ) >τand T ≤ αL(p∗(τ) − τ)q(p∗(τ))
pI if p∗(τ) >p I ≥ τ and T ≤ αL(pI − τ)q(pI)
pE ∈ [pI,∞) otherwise
(11)
2.4 Incumbent’s Best Reply
Refering to the incumbent’s payoﬀ function (5), we see that two cases must be
considered.
Case 1 pI <R E(·)
Given the entrant’s reaction function, we have that pI <τor T>α L(RE(·) −
τ)q(RE(·)). In other words, the entrant does not match the price because its margin
is negative at this price or entry is excluded by a “prohibitive” lump-sum tax. In




















∗ (t − αHs)
As t − αHs represents the eﬀective marginal cost to the incumbent, this is the
usual inverse elasticity rule for a monopolist. Let pM(s,t) ≡ p∗ (t − αHs).T h e
incumbent’s proﬁts are then15
ΠI =( p
M +( s − t))αHq(p
M)+( p
M − t)αLq(p
M) − ¯ F +( S − T)
Price pM thus represents the monopoly price when competition is made ineﬀective
because of high taxes. This case will thus prevail whenever pM <τor T>
αL(pM(s,t) − τ)q(pM(s,t)).
The following result is used in case 2.
15We omit the arguments of ΠI and pM(·) for ease of presentation.
14Lemma 1 pM(s,t) <p ∗(τ)
Proof. Since t − αHs ≤ t<a+ t = τ,w eh a v epM(s,t)=p∗(t − sαH) <p ∗(τ).
Case 2 pI ≥ RE(pI;τ,T) and T ≤ αL(RE(·) − τ)q(RE(·))
Then the entrant serves market L.L e t
p




To ﬁnd pD(a,s,t),w eﬁrst note by contradiction that it is impossible to have
pD(a,s,t) >p ∗(τ). Suppose it were the case. Since p∗(τ) >p M(s,t), the incumbent
could reduce its price to p∗(τ) without seeing any reaction from the entrant. This
would increase proﬁto nm a r k e tH, without modifying proﬁtf r o mm a r k e tL,s h o w -
ing by contradiction that the proﬁt maximizing price cannot exceed p∗(τ). Then
we must have pD(a,s,t) ≤ p∗(τ).I n t h a t c a s e , f r o m ( 11), the entrant chooses
RE(pI,τ,T)=pI. The incumbent then maximizes ΠI(pI,p I;a,t,T,s,S) under the
constraints that τ ≤ pI ≤ p∗(τ). Assuming for the moment that these constraints

























We then get the following result 17
Lemma 2 pD(a,s,t) <p M(s,t)
Proof. Since t − s −
αL
αHa<t− αHs,w eh a v ep∗(t − s −
αL
αHa) <p ∗ (t − αHs)=
pM(s,t). Since, from Lemma 1, pM(s,t) ≤ p∗(τ), this means that constraint pD(a,s,t) ≤
p∗(τ) is never binding.
16We later check whether it is in fact the case.
17Since pD(a,s,t) <p M(s,t) <p ∗(τ), the constraint pI <p ∗(τ) is satisﬁed and pD(a,s,t) is
then the solution to the incumbent’s problem.
15However, as p∗(t − s −
αL
αHa) is decreasing in s +
αL
αHa, nothing warants that
constraint p∗(t − s −
αL
αHa) ≥ τ i sm e t . H e n c ew eg e t :
p



















pD(a,s,t) if τ ≤ pM(s,t) and T ≤ αL(pM(s,t) − τ)q(pM(s,t))
pM(s,t) if τ>p M(s,t) or T>α L(pM(s,t) − τ)q(pM(s,t))
(14)
3 Benchmark Case: No Universal Service Oblig-
ation
As a benchmark case, we consider ﬁrst that the government does not impose univer-
sal service obligations. This means ﬁrst that t = T = s = S =0 . More importantly,
this also means that market H will not be served and that consequently, competition
is restricted to market L.
3.1 Second and Third Stages: Firms’ Choices
The entrant reaction function is given directly from (11)w i t hT =0and τ = a.
Since, without lump-sum tax, the entrant does not face any ﬁxed cost, the only





   
   
p∗(a) if pI ≥ p∗(a) >a
pI if p∗(a) >p I ≥ a
pE ∈ [pI,∞) otherwise
(15)
Rigorously, the incumbent proﬁt and reaction functions must in fact be reworked:
by construction, market H will not be served so that it is virtually inexistant. But we
can use an “as if” argument18 to derive the incumbent reaction function in that case:
18See appendix A for a more rigourous but equivalent derivation of the best reply.
16since market H will not be served and no USO are imposed, it is rather equivalent
to the limit case where nobody is of type H i . e .i ti sa si fαH =0 . Taking the limit






pD (a,0,0) = a if a ≤ p∗ (0)
pM(0,0) = p∗ (0) if a>p ∗ (0)











a. Moreover αL(p∗ (0) − a)q(p∗ (0)) ≶ 0 if a ≷ p∗ (0). So the incumbent reaction






p0 if a>p 0
a if a ≤ p0
3.2 First Stage: Government’s Choice
The government is commited to make the incumbent’s network activities break
even19. An access charge higher than p0 would permit the incumbent to get
monopoly proﬁts and, implicitly, the network activities would generate a positive
proﬁt since market L has been assumed proﬁtable: αLπn(q,L)=αL(aq(p0) −
F(L)) >α L(p0q(p0)−F(L)) >α L(p0q(p0)−F(L)−F(H)) > 0. The access charge
must then be less than p0. I no r d e rt oh a v ez e r op r o ﬁt for network activities, the




With such an access charge, the incumbent sets pI = a and obtains a zero proﬁtf o r
its network activities. The entrant gets the market with zero proﬁt.
In brief, without USO, the proﬁtable market is contestable: the potential entrant
can make “hit-and-run” entry and exit as its cost is composed only of the variable
cost a. With the access charge equal to the network average cost, the market is
19In this paper, informationnal problems are ignored, despite the fact that the incumbent has a
strong incentive to misreport the low ﬁxed costs.
17then disciplined to zero-proﬁt. Presumably, this is the kind of results envisonned
when network industry deregulations are advocated for. However, as the impo-
sition of USO implicitly amounts to restore the cross-subsidies that existed before
deregulations, and since cross-subsidies are unsustainable in contestable markets,
US necessarily will weaken the market constestability promoted by deregulation.
4 Universal Service Funded by an Access Charge
Uplift
We now assume that the government wants to insure US. It forces the incumbent
to serve market H and to post the same price for service on both markets. This
precludes price discrimination. In return, the government gives the assurance that
the access charge will allow the overall network activities to break even and it forbids
entry on market H. Network cost recovery implies that the access charge will equal
aggregate market average ﬁxed cost.
4.1 Second and Third Stages: Firms’ Choices
In the access charge scheme, there are no explicit taxes or subsidies so that t = T =
s = S =0 . For the entrant, the situation is thus similar to the case of no universal
service obligation and the reaction function is given by (15). For the incumbent, we
replace the tax and subsidy values into (14). Since there is no lump-sum proﬁtt a x ,
market L is necessarily proﬁtable at monopoly price pM(0,0) = p0. The incumbent’s








pD(a,0,0) if a ≤ p0
p0 if a>p 0
(16)
Proposition 1 At equilibrium under access charge uplift, pL = pH ≡ pD(a,0,0).
18Proof. Since both markets are assumed to be proﬁtable together, this means
that monopoly price p0 is higher than average cost at that price, [αLF(L)+αHF(H)]/q(p0).
We thus have a<p 0. From (16), the incumbent then chooses pI ≡ pD(a,0,0) ≥ a.
From (11), the entrant follows with pE = pI.
4.2 First Stage: Government’s Choice
Let pu = pD(a,0,0). Since Government is commited to choose au such that the






This access charge thus includes a cost component, αHF(H) that is not related to
the network segment open to competition. The entrant will then be asked to pay
for access an amount greater than the cost of the service they receive, namely the
market L network. This is the sense given to “uplift”.
F i x i n gt h ea c c e s sc h a r g et h u si n v o l v e ss o l v i n gt w oe q u a t i o n s ,( 16) with a ≤ p0

















I) − αLF(L) − αHF(H)] ≥ 0
(18)





I) − αLF(L) − αHF(H)] ≥ 0 (19)
Both companies share the total market ﬁxed cost in proportion of their market.
This comes from the fact that, by setting the access-charge equal to both market
average ﬁxed costs, the regulator has created a level-playing ﬁeld for both ﬁrms.
Linkages between both markets created by the non-discriminatory price constraint,
however, renders the incumbent less agressive on market L;ap r o ﬁti sm a d eb yt h e
20We assume here that there exists a positive solution in (pI,a) for this set of equations.
19entrant on this market, showing that the market is not contestable.21
We now present a condition that determines whether the industry proﬁti sp o s i -
tive or nil.
Lemma 3 Let ¯ p be such that ¯ p =
¯ F
q(¯ p).( i ) I f αH >η (¯ p),22 then pu
I >a u and ﬁrms’
proﬁt is positive; (ii) if αH ≤ η(¯ p), then pu
I = au =¯ p and ﬁrms’ proﬁti sn i l .
Proof. (i) Assume that αH >η (¯ p) and that the equilibrium solution is pu
I =
au =¯ p. Then, from (5) with pI >R E(·) and s = t =0 ,w ec a nw r i t et h ei n c u m b e n t ’ s





0 (¯ p)+αHq(¯ p)+¯ pαLq
0 (¯ p)
=¯ pq
0 (¯ p)+αHq (¯ p)
> ¯ pq
0 (¯ p)+η(¯ p)q(¯ p)=0
But this means that increasing the price would increase proﬁt, proving that pu
I =
au =¯ p is not an equilibrium. The equilibrium is then such that pu





I), each ﬁrm’s proﬁt is positive.




I ≤ 0 at ¯ p. But as the incumbent’s price cannot be chosen below ¯ p = au,
¯ p is the equilibrium price.
The intuition behind Lemma 3 is as follows. When the incumbent increases its
price, revenues are lost from market L access charges receipts because of the decrease
of demand on market L. Such a price increase is thus beneﬁcial only if the incumbent
operates in the inelastic portion of the demand, so that a price increase brings a
revenue increase, and if market H is suﬃciently large (and consequently, market
21Welfare maximization under both non-discrimination constraint and non-negative proﬁtc o n -
straint would lead to average cost pricing : pL = pH =
n




.T h i s p r i c e i s







would leave no economic proﬁtt ot h eﬁrms.
22Note that, since the uplift makes the incumbent perceive a “negative” marginal cost, the
equilibrium price will in general be situated in the inelastic portion of the demand.
20Lis relatively small), so that this revenue increase can compensate lost revenue on
market L. On contrary, if the percentage of the population which lives in H is lower
than the percentage of demand reduction following a price increase, the revenue gain
αHq of selling a given quantity at a higher price will not compensate for the revenue
loss associated to the loss of demand for the whole population ¯ pq0 (¯ p). Then, price
will be set at the lowest price possible and markets can be considered contestable.
As a particular case, if αH =0 , then we retrieve the no universal service solution
found in the preceding section.
We thus see that the access charge uplift can maintain constestable market results
provided that markets to be protected by universal service are not too large.
5 Universal Service Fund
We now consider the case where the government establishes a US fund. The fund
is raised in order to compensate for USO with a unit subsidy and/or a lump-sum
subsidy on market H. The entrant is not eligible to the subsidies, so that market H
is monopolistic. The access charge is maintained to insure that network activities





The fund is raised either by a lump-sum subsidy or a unit tax.
5.1 Second and Third Stages: Firm’s Choices
T h es c h e m ew ec o n s i d e ri so n ew h e r ea>0, T ≥ 0,t≥ 0, s ≥ 0 and S ≥ 0.T h e
reaction function of the entrant is thus given by (11) and the incumbent reaction
function is given by (14). We can then characterize the equilibrium in the second
stage.
Proposition 2 At equilibrium under Universal Service Fund, pL = pH ≡ pD(a,s,t).
21Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that the incumbent can sustain









− ¯ F + S − T



















− F(L) (since F(L) < ¯ F)









which implies that pM(s,t) ≥ a+t = τ. But this contradicts the fact that to sustain
this monopoly price, we must have τ>p M(s,t). Then, no equilibrium exists with
τ>p M(s,t). Government must then choose a, s and t such that τ ≤ pM(s,0). The
incumbent then chooses pI = pD(a,s,t) ≥ τ and the entrant follows with pE = pI.
The exact value of the equilibrium price then depends on the rules used to ﬁx
the taxes. We consider in turn the lump-sum tax and the unit tax.
5.2 First Stage with a Lump-Sum Tax
When the fund is raised strictly with the lump-sum tax T,w eh a v et =0 .L e t






Then two cases are considered by the government. If proﬁts made on market L are
high enough, it will raise a fund T suﬃcient to compensate entirely the incumbent
for network costs. If market L proﬁts are too low to reach such a goal, it will raise
the highest fund possible, which amounts to market L proﬁt, to compensate as much
as possible the incumbent for the network activities.
Assume ﬁr s tt h a tm a r k e tL proﬁts are suﬃcient to pay for aggregate network
costs and let (s+,S+) be the subsidy vector that allows for network cost recovery.
22Then, (s+,S+) is such that:
a
TαLq(p
T)+( a + s
+)αHq(p
T)+S
+ = ¯ F (22)




+ = αH(F(H) − F(L))






This scenario is valid whenever the amount of such a lump-sum tax is lower than
market L proﬁt i.e. whenever
T
+ = αH(F(H) − F(L)) <α L(pL − a)q(pL)=αLpLq (pL) − αLF(L) (24)
Assume second that (24) is not veriﬁed, so that government taxes away proﬁto n
market L:
T
0 = αLpLq(pL) − αLF(L) (25)
Then the subsidy vector (s0,S0) is constrained as follows
s
0αHq(pI)+S
0 = αL(pLq (pL) − F(L))
Lemma 4 Usage of a lump-sum subsidy can never increase the welfare associated
to the US fund.
Proof. Suppose we have an equilibrium with S>0,T>0 and s ≥ 0.W e h a v e
then two cases to consider.
(i) The equilibrium is such that there is complete compensation of network cost.
We ﬁr s tn o t et h a t ,w h e nt h ec a s eo fc o m p l e t ec o m p e n s a t i o no fn e t w o r kc o s t s
prevail, pT







>a T. Assume that we have an equilibrium with S+ > 0. Then,
from (23), a small reduction in S+ could be accompanied by a small increase in
23s+ for a given T +. Indeed if S+ > 0 then totally diﬀerentiating (26), (20) and
pT
I = pD ¡
aT,s +,0
¢



































. As this price is initially higher than marginal cost (assumed to
b ez e r o ) ,t h i sw o u l dl e a dt oa ni n c r e a s eo fw e l f a r e( d e ﬁned in 1):s i n c ep∗0 (·) > 0




(ii) The equilibrium is such that the entrant makes no proﬁt.
We ﬁr s tn o t et h a tt oh a v eaz e r op r o ﬁtw i t hT 0 > 0,p T
I = pD(aT,s 0,0) must
necessarily be greater than a.W e t h u s h a v e pD(a,s,0) = p∗(−s−
αL
αHa) >a .A s s u m e
that we have an equilibrium with S0 > 0. Then, from (25), a small reduction in S0
could be accompanied by a small increase in s0 for a given T +. This change allows






. As this price is initially higher
than marginal cost (assumed to be zero), this would lead to an increase of welfare23.
• Complete compensation of network costs














































I ) − F(L)
¢
− αH(F(H) − F(L))
(27)




24which was assumed positive for this case. Proﬁt of the incumbent is computed















I ) − F(L)
¢
(28)
This is also positive since a positive ΠE in (27) implies that pT
I q(pT
I ) >F(L).
Instead of sharing the network cost in proportion of market share, as it was the
case under the uplift scheme, the entire network cost, net of the part paid by
the incumbent for network access on market H (αHF(L)) is transfered to the
entrant in order to fund the unit subsidy of the non-proﬁtable market, where
production has to be stimulated.
Since the incremental cost of serving market H is paid by the market L sup-
plier, this case is most likely to occur when αL is relatively large24.W i t h a
high αL and a low αH, the transfer per unit of market L output T +/αLq(pD
T )=
αH[F(H) − F(L)]/αL could well be small even though F(H) is high relative
to F(L). USO would then not seem to be an important problem. For in-
stance, France supplies high cost electricity services to its overseas population
at the same price that it does to its low-cost continental consumers. But the
proportion of overseas population is so low that, presumably, USO would not
impact signiﬁcantly on a continental competitive market.
• Zero-proﬁto nm a r k e tL


















The equilibrium price can be characterized more fully by using Proposition 2,






















24Remember that we assumed that there exists a price p0 such that p0q(p0)−αLF(L)−αHF(H) >
0. Since the revenue of the entrant will be αLpT
I q(pT
I ), we see that complete compensation is
possible to the extent that αL is suﬃciently large and pT
I suﬃciently “close” to p0.




• The equilibrium price is thus totally independent of cost. This is because we
are in a situation where the whole market proﬁt goes to the incumbent, which
acknoledge this before choosing its price.













I ) − αLF(L) − αHF(H) (30)
which is non-negative because pT
I is bounded below by ¯ p.25 Proﬁto ft h e
entrant is nil by assumption.
It turns out that the lump-sum transfer T 0 is equal to the incumbent’s op-
portunity cost of letting the entrant serve the market at price pT
I rather than
serving itself the market at that price: T 0 = αL(pT
I − aT)q(pT
I ).T h e o v e r a l l














The ﬁrst term represents the average incremental cost to the incumbent of
entry in market L, while the second represents the opportunity cost to the
incumbent of this entry at price pT
I . The sum of the two terms can be as-
similated to Baumol and Sidak’s ECPR rule, with two caveats. First, in our
model, the price pT
I is set endogenously by the incumbent, while, in Baumol
and Sidak’s model, the price is exogenously set by a regulator. As a result,
Baumol and Sidak cannot evaluate the allocative eﬃciency of their rule, while
we can compare it to other funding schemes. Second, Baumol and Sidak in-
clude the overall payment (31) in the access charge, while we split it into an
25Conditions under which this proﬁt is positive or nil are derived below.
26Revenue minus costs on transport activities are then
aTαLq(pL)+T − αLF(L) − αHF(H)=T − αHF(H)
which is assumed here to be less than or equal to zero.
26access charge and a lump-sum tax, and we also split the incumbent receipt
into an access-charge and a unit subsidy. This is also related to the fact that
the price is set endogenously in our model: market power means that prices
will be set ineﬃciently high by the incumbent. We thus need two independent
instruments, a and s,27 to reach two diﬀerent goals, network cost recovery and
the reduction of allocative ineﬃciency, respectively.
Note that hitting the market L proﬁt constraint is likely to happen whenever
αH is signiﬁcant and/or the diﬀerence between F(H) and F(L) is important.
For instance, in Canada, 70% of the population is concentrated in a small band
of territory (the “Quebec-Windsor corridor”), while 30% of the population
is dispersed over a huge territory. Insuring service at the same price over
the whole territory, as in the postal services, then leads to signiﬁcant price
distortions and cross-subsidies from urban regions to rural ones.
We now provide a condition under which the industry proﬁt wil be nil.Note that
contrary to the access charge uplift scheme, αH >η (¯ p) will not necessarily lead to
positive proﬁt.
Lemma 5 Let ¯ p be such that ¯ p =
¯ F
q(¯ p).I f αH ≤ η(¯ p), then pT
I =¯ p and ﬁrms’ proﬁt
is nil
Proof. From Lemma 3, if αH ≤ η(¯ p), pu













I would be the incumbent’s choice of price were it not constrained to choose a price
higher than au.
• Consider ﬁrst the case of complete compensation of network costs when we are















I > ¯ p ≥ pu



























27Of course, T is not an independent instrument given a and s.
27Then, since p∗ is monotone increasing we have




























I ) >q (pu
I), in contradiction with the initial assumption that
pT
I >p u
I. We thus have pT
I =¯ p. Then both ﬁrms’ proﬁt is nil.
• Consider second the case of zero proﬁt of the entrant. Since we have just
shown that no proﬁt is possible for the incumbent even when we consider
initially that the entrant non-negative proﬁt constraint is not binding, no proﬁt
is possible when the entrant non-negative proﬁt is binding. In fact, the two
cases collapses in this case with pT
I =¯ p as the only feasible solution.
Lemma 6 If αH >η (¯ p),28 then pT
I > ¯ p and ﬁrms’ proﬁt is positive.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium price pT





   
   
¯ p if αH ≤ η(¯ p)




I ) − F(L)
¢











I ) − F(L)
¢
≥ αH(F(H) − F(L))
5.3 First Stage with a Unit Tax
5.4 First Stage: Government’s choice







28Note that, since the uplift makes the incumbent perceive a “negative” marginal cost, the
equilibrium price will in general be situated in the inelastic portion of the demand.
28Total transfers made to the incumbent must cover the loss due to transport activities
on market H:29
sαHq(p
t)+S = αH(F(H) − aq(p
t)) (33)






We assume for the moment that this tax rate leaves a positive proﬁtf o rm a r k e tL
operations. We will check later that this is in fact the case at equilibrium.
Government has two instruments to make a subsidy for US service: a unit
subsidy and a lump-sum subsidy. It is shown in Appendix C that, in fact, the
lump-sum subsidy is useless. Intutively, this is because the lump-sum subsidy,
while being ﬁnanced through a distortionary tax, does not allow to incite producers
to increase output as can do a unit subsidy and as is wished in a monopoly and
duopoly structure.
Lemma 7 There always exists an equilibrium with S =0 .
Proof. See appendix C.










































I) − αLF(L) − αHF(H)
¤
≥ 0
29Technically, the constraint is sαHq(pI)+S ≥ αH(F(H) − aq(pI)), but since the lump-sum
subsidy is ﬁnanced by a distortionary unit tax, government will always want to give the lowest
lump-sum subsidy possible. We take this factor into account immediately for ease of presentation.
29while proﬁto ft h ee n t r a n ti s
ΠE = αL(p
t








I) − αLF(L) − αHF(H)
¤
≥ 0 (36)
Proposition 4 Unit tax funding is equivalent to the access charge uplift.
Proof. We have that pt
















pD(au,0,0). Substituting this price into (35) and (18), we see that the incumbent’s
proﬁt is the same under both schemes. Similarly, substituting this price into (36)
and (19) show that the entrant’s proﬁt is the same under both schemes. Finally,
government balances budget under the unit tax funding scheme, while no money
transit to government in the case of an access charge uplift.
The equivalence comes from two sources. First, monopoly pricing is unsustain-
able in both schemes. If monopoly pricing were an equilibrium in both schemes,
incentives provided by the schemes would be diﬀerent as can be seen from (16) and
(14): a unit subsidy s>0 makes the monopoly price pM(s,0) lower than the price
p0 that would prevail under the access charge uplift. Second, given that duopoly
pricing prevails, the government budget constraint insures that the incentives that
can be given through the US fund are identical to those given under the access charge
uplift. To see this, consider the government budget constraint (3). As transfers
to market H must be ﬁnanced by market L, we must have, under unit tax funding
with S =0 ,t h a tsαH = t. The total subsidy per unit of market H output is thus :
σ









Since the access charge at is meant to ﬁnance market L network while the unit sub-
sidy s is meant to ﬁnance the incremental ﬁxed cost of serving market H consumers,
we have s =[ F(H) − F(L)]/q and at = F(L)/q. Then the total unit subsidy

























30The incumbent thus receives the same per unit subsidy whether it is under the unit
tax scheme or under the access charge uplift. Similarly, for the entrant
τ
t = a











i.e. the entrant faces the same marginal cost whether it is under the unit tax regime
or under the access charge uplift.
6W e l f a r e C o m p a r i s o n s
In the following propositions, we compare the various fund systems we have analyzed
in sections 5 and 5.3. Since we have just stated in proposition 4, that unit tax
funding is equivalent to an access charge uplift, those comparisons are limited to
both lump-sum tax and access charge uplift schemes.
First we give the following useful intermediate result.
Lemma 8 Let ¯ p be such that ¯ p =
¯ F
q(¯ p).I f αH >η (¯ p),t h e npT
I <p u
I, i.e price is
lower under lump-sum funding than under the access charge uplift.











must consider two cases:





































I ). But this is contradiction with
Lemma 3 which states that industry proﬁt is positive under the access charge
uplift scheme when αH >η (¯ p).A s a r e s u l t , pT
I <p u
I.














.A s s u m e t h a t pT
I ≥ pu
I. Then, since
p∗ is monotone increasing, we have




























I ) >q (pu
I), in contradiction with the initial assumption that
pT
I ≥ pu
I. We must then have pT
I <p u
I whenever the entrant’s proﬁt is positive.
For both cases, we thus obtain that pT
I <p u
I.
We can now state that prices are never higher under lump-sum funding (with a
unit subsidy) than under the access charge uplift.
Proposition 5 The equilibrium price under a US fund raised through a lump-sum
tax does not exceed the equilibrium price under the access charge uplift, i.e. pT
I ≤ pu
I
Proof. This results directly from the combination of Lemma 5 and Lemma 8.
Proposition 6 Social welfare under lump-sum funding is greater or equal to social
welfare under the access charge uplift
Proof. Since from (1), we have dW
dpI = −q(pI) < 0, directly applying 5, leads to
the result.
Proposition 3 is rather intuitive. Welfare is maximized whenever pH = pL =
MC =0 , where pH and pL are prices on markets H and L, respectively, and MC
stands for marginal cost. Moreover, with zero marginal cost, maximization of wel-
fare corresponds to maximization of consumers’ surplus. Since consumers’ surplus
is decreasing in price, the lower the price, the higher is social welfare. Let pu
µ and
pT















welfare is higher under the US fund.
The superiority of lump-sum funding comes from the fact that it reduces the





q ), so that competition from the entrant is more eﬀective,
which means that the incumbent’s monopoly power from linked markets is made
32lower. In other words, the part of network costs that is ﬁnanced through lump-
sum funding does not impact on the entrant’s behavior and allows to ﬁnance a unit
subsidy that incites the incumbent to increase the output. Lump-sum funding thus
allows to use two instruments: the access charge and a unit subsidy, to meet two
objectives, network ﬁnancing and increased output. The access charge uplift uses
only one instrument to meet both objectives. Note also that the fact that lump-sum
funding works better than unit tax funding is because the lump-sum funding helps
to ﬁnance a “genuine” net subsidy: the unit tax only permits to create a subsidy
which is the exact equivalent to the uplift of the access charge scheme.
Corollary 1 If the revenue function R(p) ≡ pq(p) is strictly concave, ∀p,i n d u s t r y
proﬁt under the access charge uplift is greater or equal to industry proﬁtu n d e rl u m p -
sum funding.
Proof. Let p0 = p∗(0) be the proﬁt maximizing price for a monopoly. >From
the facts that pT
I ≤ pu
I <p 0 and that the proﬁt function is strictly concave30,w e
then have that industry proﬁt is higher under the access charge.
Because both funding schemes only redistribute proﬁtf r o mo n eﬁrm to the other,
industry proﬁt is the lowest the farther a funding scheme brings the price from p0.
By using better incentives to increase the production, i.e. by making better use
of potential competition from the entrant, lump-sum funding has more success in
increasing output than does the access charge uplift. As a result, the gap between
the equilibrium price and monopoly price is made higher, and proﬁti sl o w e r .
Note also that, in cases where they make a positive proﬁt, both ﬁrms prefer
the imposition of USO over free competition (no USO)31: USO confers monopoly
power to the incumbent on a newly proﬁtable market and, with non-discrimination
constraint, lessens competition to an otherwise contestable market. In all cases,
30This comes from the fact that the revenue function is assumed concave and that the cost
function is linear.
31In the case that the introduction of a US fund leaves the entrant with no proﬁt, the entrant is
indiﬀerent between the fund and no USO. Otherwise, both ﬁrms strictly prefer USO.
33consumers of the market L, who pay for USO, are losers of its imposition, and
consumers of initially non-proﬁtable markets, who are not served without USO, are
beneﬁciaries of USO. As pT
I ≤ pu
I, both market consumers prefer the (lump-sum/unit
subisdy) fund over the access charge.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Introduction of USO funding schemes reduces the contestability of markets to a
point where the incumbent accomodates entry in the proﬁtable market in order to
relax the non-discrimination constraint and manage to get a proﬁt on the high cost
market.
Welfare can be higher under the US fund than under the uplift (or the US
fund with unit tax) because the unit subsidy incites output expansion, and thereby
counters the output restriction that the non-discrimination constraint provokes by
lessening market constestability on proﬁtable markets. This output expansion,
however, reduces industry proﬁts. The incumbent could still prefer the US fund
because of the receipts it gets from it; however, the entrant always prefer the access
charge uplift.
Low-cost consumers are losers of USO service as they ﬁnance them. However,
they prefer the US fund over the access charge uplift because the price is lower with
unit subsidies. The same reason leads the high-cost consumers to also prefer US
fund scenario.
Two extensions should readily be studied. First, as ﬁrms can foresee what are
the consequences of their actions on the government’s choice, one could consider
that the government, in fact, plays last. Since government uses rules to set the
uplift and the subsidy, one can suspect that the ﬁrms can take into account these
rules and then manage to set monopoly prices on both markets. This conjecture,
however, has to be shown formally. If conﬁrmed, it would send a warning for the
long run market power consequences of USOs.
34Second, entrant’s marginal cost of distribution should be assumed diﬀerent from
the incumbent’s and unknown to the incumbent and government. This would
allow to consider problems of productive eﬃciency such as (i) the possibility that
entry occurs ineﬃciently (i.e. entry while the entrant’s cost is higher than the
incumbent’s) or (ii) the possibility that entry is blocked ineﬃciently (i.e. no entry
while the entrant’s cost is lower than the incumbent’s). Although problems of
productive eﬃciency have been studied extensively in the access pricing literature,
to our knowledge, there exists no model that looks at US funding while considering
both allocative and productive eﬃciency.
Appendices
A. No USO: incumbent’s reaction
The incumbent maximizes its proﬁt given the entrant’s reaction function RE and






αL(aq (pE) − F (L)) if pI ≥ RE(pI;a,0)
αL (pIq(pI) − F (L)) if pI <R E(pI;a,0)
We then have two cases to consider:
1.i fpI <R E(pI;a,0), given the entrant’s reaction function, it must be the case
that pI ≤ a because if the contrary holds (pI >a ), it leads to the contradiction
pI >p I. So maximizing ΠI(pI,p E,a) w.r.t. pI ≤ a when pE ∈ [pI,∞],i s






αL (pIq(pI) − F (L))
a − pI ≥ 0





{p0|p0q0 (p0)+q (p0)=0 } if p0 <a
a if p0 ≥ a
















I = αL (aq (a) − F (L)) if p
0 ≥ a
2. If pI ≥ RE (pI;a) then given the entrant’s reaction function, we have two
sub-cases to consider:
(a) p∗ (a) >p I = RE (pI;a) ≥ a, the incumbent’s proﬁti sΠ2a
I (pI)=
αL (aq (pI)) − F (L))
(b) pI ≥ RE (pI;a)=p∗ (a) >a , the incumbent’s proﬁti sΠ2b
I = αL (aq(p∗
E (a)) − F (L))
Since for all pI <p ∗ (a), q(pI) >q (p∗ (a)) then Π2a
I (pI) > Π2b
I and
a =a r gm a x pI≥a Π2a
I (pI). So the solution is pI = a.
Finally by summing up the results, we see that:
• if p0 ≥ a then Π1b
I = Π2a
I (a) and the optimal incumbent’s reply is pI = a
• if p0 <athen Π1a
I > Π2a
I (a) and the optimal incumbent’s reply is pI = p0







p0 if a>p 0
a if a ≤ p0
B. Formal proof of lemma 4
If S0 > 0 then totally diﬀerentiating (25), (20) and pT
















































































































C .F o r m a lp r o o fo fl e m m a7
(i) Assume that we have an equilibrium with S>0 and pt
I = pD(a,s,t)=τ.F r o m
(32) and (33), we can easily form
p
t
I = τ =
¯ F
q(τ)
Diﬀerentiating it and doting variables to denote the derivate with respect to S (that
is ˙ a = da
dS, ˙ t = da
dS, ˙ s = ds
dS, ˙ τ = dτ
dS), proves that this price is invariant to the subsidy
manipulations
˙ τ = ˙ τη(τ) ⇒ ˙ τ =0
Moreover similarly we have
˙ t = η(τ)
˙ τ
τ




Thus diﬀerentiating (34), we see that
˙ s = −
1
αHq(τ)
Since ˙ τ =0 , manipulating S is not harmful from a social point of view, so S =0is
also optimal.
(ii) Assume that we have an equilibrium with S>0 and pt
I = pD(a,s,t) >τ ,
diﬀerentiating (32), (34), (33) and pt
I = p∗
³




, and doting variables to
denote the derivate with respect to S (that is ˙ a = da
dS, ˙ t = da
dS, ˙ s = ds

















































37Isolating ˙ s from the second and substituing ˙ a and ˙ t gives
















































































































which proves that ˙ pt
I > 0 because at the equilibrium ∀S ≥ 0,using (32), (34) and










< 0 so η(pt
I) is necessarily
lower than 1.T o ﬁnish the proof, we have just to remember that the welfare is
decreasing w.r.t the uniform price pt
I.
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